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Abstract. The Lightning Network is a so-called second-layer technology built on top
of the Bitcoin blockchain to provide “off-chain" fast payment channels between users,
which means that not all transactions are settled and stored on the main blockchain. In
this paper, we model the emergence of the Lightning Network as a (bond) percolation
process and we explore how the distributional properties of the volume and size of
transactions per user may impact its feasibility. The agents are all able to reciprocally
transfer Bitcoins using the main blockchain and also – if economically convenient –
to open a channel on the Lightning Network and transact “off chain". We base our
approach on fitness-dependent network models: as in real life, a Lightning channel is
opened with a probability that depends on the “fitness" of the concurring nodes, which
in turn depends on wealth and volume of transactions. The emergence of a connected
component is studied numerically and analytically as a function of the parameters, and
the phase transition separating regions in the phase space where the Lightning Network
is sustainable or not is elucidated. We characterize the phase diagram determining the
minimal volume of transactions that would make the Lightning Network sustainable
for a given level of fees or, alternatively, the maximal cost the Lightning ecosystem
may impose for a given average volume of transactions. The model includes parameters
that could be in principle estimated from publicly available data once the evolution of
the Lighting Network will have reached a stationary operable state, and is fairly robust
against different choices of the distributions of parameters and fitness kernels.
Keywords: Blockchain, Lightning Network, Payment Networks, Percolation,
Fitness Models
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21. Introduction
Bitcoin, the pioneering cryptocurrency, has brought about an unprecedented revolution
in the payment industry [1]. Despite its traction and success over the last ten years, the
original blockchain – the technological infrastructure underlying Bitcoin – suffers from
some limitations that may hinder the future growth and adoption of the cryptocurrency.
One of the major issue is the scalability of the system: the current number of transactions
validated via this platform is between 3 and 7 transactions per second, compared for
instance to thousands of transactions handled by the Visa circuit [2]. The lack of
scalability is mainly caused by constraints on throughput of transactions, with the block
size fixed at 1MB, and by the high latency – with a new block created on average only
every ten minutes. Those limitations are imposed to safeguard the security of the
platform against malicious attacks and are difficult to relax without major changes in
the protocol.
The main solutions proposed to address the scalability issue include (i) changes to
the main protocol (consensus algorithm, parameters) and (ii) sidechains∗ and second-
layer solutions (see [4] for a recent technical review). Notable examples of type-(i)
solutions include new consensus protocols, which would allow a faster issuance of new
blocks among other new features [5]. The Lightning Network (LN), instead, is a so-called
second-layer technology built on top of the Bitcoin blockchain to provide “off-chain" fast
payment channels between users [6]. By off-chain we mean that not all transactions are
settled and stored on the main blockchain. In a nutshell, the idea of a Lightning channel
is the following: two parties lock the same amount of money as collateral and open a
channel for a certain period of time. During this time, they can then exchange money
back and forth through the channel, and only the netted transaction will be eventually
validated and stored on the main blockchain. If one party is malicious and does not
correctly update the balance, the other can keep the collateral posted by the malicious
party, as a form of insurance. Any two users can open a channel and all other participants
can use one or more existing channels to route transactions off-chain upon payment of a
fee to channel “owners". The scalability problem could be solved if a sufficient number
of channels were opened, implying that the Lightning Network spans across the whole
pool of users of the main blockchain.
The Lightning Network topology is, indeed, relevant to understand the resilience of
the system to attacks or random failures and its robustness. Measures of the network
structure based on empirical data – such as degree distribution, assortativity, shortest
paths length – provide an indication of the efficiency of payments’ routing and features of
the system (i.e. average number of channel per user, clusters and communities, etc.) [7].
Experiments on random or targeted nodes removal from the network give information
∗Sidechains are blockchains “connected" to the main Bitcoin blockchain such that Bitcoins can be
transferred bidirectionally between the main and side blockchain [3]. At the same time, sidechains are
completely separate ecosystems whose technical features or issues would not be shared with the main
blockchain.
3on the system resilience by monitoring when the original network is broken into multiple
isolated clusters [8–10]. In the Lightning Network case, it has been shown that some
types of targeted attacks – aimed at consuming, for instance, the channels’ liquidity of
specific nodes – may yield severe consequences for the resilience of the network in terms
of average payment flow and reachability [11].
The topology of the network is in turn driven by users’ economic incentives to relay
transactions “off-chain". Moreover, as the Lightning fees are set by channels’ owners, an
important question is how high such fees should be set in order to guarantee profits but
providing at the same time the right incentives for Bitcoin users to participate in the
Lightning Network. In a recent work on simple network topologies (i.e. bidirectional
channels and star graphs), the authors have estimated the demand for transactions
on the main Bitcoin blockchain compared to the LN, the level of LN fees that would
cover maintenance costs of the channel and their implication for the overall network
security [12]. Indeed, transacting on the Lightning Network might impact the security
of the main blockchain network by inducing a decrease in the amount of fees collected
by the miners for the validation of blockchain transactions. Moreover, LN’s transaction
fees have been empirically studied using a traffic simulator [13].
Fees on the main blockchain are used as incentives to miners (i.e. nodes capable
of validating transactions and generating new blocks) to contribute to the security of
the platform∗. Normally, users “compete" to set up the minimal fees that would ensure
that their transaction be validated within a given timeframe, as miners try to maximise
the total amount of fees per block. A strand of the literature has been investigating
the Bitcoin fee set-up mechanisms, the miners’ incentives and their potential correlation
with risks of attacks and manipulation of the transaction history. In [16] the authors use
a game-theoretic model to investigate the factors influencing the value of Bitcoin fees,
while in [17] they also examine the interplay between fees and security of the platform,
theoretically showing that the current fee model may not be sustainable on the long
run. Alternative fee mechanisms have also been proposed, for instance based on auction
models [16], and compared with the existing one to highlight weaknesses and possible
improvements.
The Bitcoin ecosystem has been already extensively investigated using approaches
based on complex networks. The transactions network has been studied to understand
latency issues and propagation mechanisms in peer-to-peer systems [18] and inefficiencies
of the process of permanent inclusion of the transactions on the blockchain [19] . Global
and local structural properties of the users’ network in Bitcoin have also provided
insights on booms and bust events [20] and Bitcoin price dynamics [21]. Moreover,
data on users’ behaviour and spending patterns have been used to understand the global
state of the crypto-economy [22] and the drivers of the growth of the network [23]. More
generally, our paper taps into the growing literature on quantitative investigations of the
cryptocurrencies landscape, including models of pricing and adoption of tokens [24–27],
∗The blockchain security is associated with the platform’s decentralization, hence to the miners’
total computing power [14,15].
4analysis of the market structure [28–34] and price prediction based on sentiment and
social interactions [35–43].
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions in terms of blockchain and
Lightning fees, average wealth and volume of transactions per users, a Lightning Network
that spans a sizeable fraction of Bitcoin users – thus solving the scalability problem –
emerges. We model the emergence of the Lightning Network as a (bond) percolation
process on a graph, exploring how different conditions may impact its feasibility [44]. In
particular, we consider fitness-dependent network models [45–48] where the probability
of creating a new edge depends on intrinsic node features collectively denoted node
fitness. In the LN case, the node fitness will be defined in terms of the node wealth
and activity (i.e. volume of transactions). The viability of the Lightning Network
will be characterized in terms of the presence (or not) of a giant connected cluster of
nodes: a non-fragmented network would, indeed, guarantee a smooth relay of payments
and information between users and will incentivize off-chain transactions. Our model
depends on parameters that can be all obtained – or at least estimated – from publicly
available data, and is fairly robust against different choices of distributions of parameters
and fitness kernels.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a quick overview of
the main Bitcoin blockchain and the main ideas behind LN. In Section 3 we describe
our model and provide the relevant theory, which is then applied to two specific wealth
distributions (uniform and exponential) in the subsections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
In Section 4, we discuss the results of numerical simulations, and we provide some
conclusions and outlook in Section 5. The Appendices are devoted to technical aspects
of percolation theory on networks and are included to make the paper self-contained.
2. The Bitcoin blockchain and Lightning Network
In this section, we summarize the main features of the Bitcoin main blockchain and
Lightning Network payment layer. The Bitcoin blockchain is a distributed, shared ledger
that immutably records transactions among peers in the network [1, 14]. Transactions
are bundled in blocks and chained together via cryptographic primitives to ensure that
any change at any point in the transaction history would invalidate the full record.
Transactions are validated for correctness, temporarily stored in memory pools and
then arranged in the blocks data structure by miners : multiple miners compete using
computational power to validate the next block of the chain – and therefore earn the
associated reward for the service and transactions’ fees–according to the Proof-of-Work
consensus algorithm. Depending on the usage of the network and due to limitation in
block size, waiting times can peak around 30 minutes (while the typical range is around
6−8 minutes), while blockchain fees per transaction exhibit a broad range of variability,
from a few cents to 40− 50 USD∗.
∗Data taken from https://www.blockchain.com/charts .
5Figure 1. Panel (A): Scheme of a payment channel between party A and B, including
opening and closing transactions settled on the main blockchain, and intermediate
transfers handled off-chain on the Lightning Network. Initially, the two parties lock
m bitcoins each, plus the fee φ that would cover broadcasting on the main blockchain.
At each time step t, users exchange an amount α(t)r and update their balances
accordingly, by sending each other redeemable receipts without committing them on
the main blockchain. Only when the two parties agree that the channel is no longer
needed, they settle the net balance of funds on their original Bitcoin addresses. Panel
(B): Scheme of payments routing on a Lightning Network: even if party 1 and 4 are not
directly connected via an existing LN channel, they can route their payments through
other parties (upon payment of a fee) by choosing a suitable cryptographic lock for the
Bitcoins.
The idea behind the creation of the Lightning Network [6] is, therefore, to devise
a network for frequent and fast micro-transactions that can be performed at low
transactions fees. The basic components of the Lightning Network are payment channels
(schematically shown in Fig. 1, panel A), enabling trustless transfers between users.
In the typical payment channel implementation, a theoretically unlimited amount of
payments can be made, with only two transactions broadcast on the blockchain. In
addition to a reduction of number of blockchain transactions and associated costs,
payment channels also offer the advantage of speed and, importantly, the ability of
users to recover their funds if one of the parties is malicious.
A channel is established between two parties by locking an initial amount of funds,
for instance m Bitcoins for each user, on the main blockchain, which represent the
maximum amount of Bitcoins that can be transferred over the channel. Funds are
locked on so-called 2-of-2 multisignature addresses [14], which can be unlocked upon
providing the signature of both interested parties. For instance, user A wishes to send
r Bitcoins to user B: she signs a transaction, sends it to B, who will sign it and send
it back to A. Only the first transaction is recorded on the main blockchain. At each
time step in the lifetime of the channels, the users keep sending back and forth signed
transactions that can be at any point consensually broadcast on the main blockchain to
close the channel and redeem the net amount of funds. To prevent fraudulent behavior,
6for instance user B not acknowledging the receipt of a payment from A, a refund option
is always included in any exchange. The refund option can be unilaterally unlocked
and submitted to the blockchain after a certain amount of time t? has elapsed from the
moment the channel was first established. Every new refund option is indeed signed
by both parties, signaling therefore that they are in agreement with the terms of the
refund, which may be exercised unilaterally at a later time. In the worst-case scenario,
one party would simply submit the original refund transaction created contextually with
the opening of the channel.
Payments can be relayed via the Lightning Network also if two parties are not
directly connected via a Lightning channel, if there exists a path indirectly linking them
via existing channels owned by third parties. Exploiting an existing path to route the
payments may often prove more convenient as the two interested parties need not open a
new channel, therefore saving the associated costs in blockchain fees. Channels’ owners
are indeed owed “routing fees" to allow payments through their channel, but at the
moment those fees are very competitive (∼ 4 orders of magnitude less than the Bitcoin
blockchain∗). In Fig. 1, Panel B we show an example of an indirect routing path between
user 1 and 4. One of the biggest issues of the Lightning Network is the limitation in
liquidity. Payments are made by effectively having intermediaries forwarding collateral
across multiple channels: this means that if party 1 is transferring ` Bitcoins to party
4, each relaying channel needs to have at least ` Bitcoins available in the direction of
the payment.
To prevent dishonest behavior in the transfer from party 1 to 4 via party 2 and 3
(see Fig. 1, Panel B), Party 1 will lock the Bitcoins with a secret key known only by
the receiver: when party 4 receives the Bitcoins from party 3, the secret is revealed and
every player can collect their coins and fees [14].
3. Model Setup
In this section, we model the emergence of the Lightning Network as a (bond) percolation
process. We consider N agents, who are all able to reciprocally transfer Bitcoins using
the main blockchain and – if economically convenient – to open a channel on the
Lightning Network and transact “off chain". We introduce the node capacity (or wealth)
wi of node i, a random variable extracted from a pdf Π(w), which is proportional to the
maximum amount of Bitcoins that node i can lock in a Lightning channel it partakes
in. We will consider two explicit examples for the wealth distribution (uniform and
exponential) in the following, with qualitatively similar results.
Two nodes are more likely to open a Lightning channel if they expect to submit a
large number of transactions over a given period of time. Therefore, we introduce for
each node i a quantity `i that represents its “activity" in terms of average number of
transactions node i sends through each channel in the network. The average number of
transactions is also a random variable extracted from the discrete distribution Πˆ(`) over
∗Data taken from https://1ml.com/statistics and https://bitcoinfees.info .
7non-negative integers. We also include the costs associated with transacting over one
of the two networks (main blockchain only or blockchain and Lightning). These costs
can be fixed per transaction (base fee) or can be calculated as a percentage of the value
transferred (fee rate).
• c, Lightning channel maintenance/usage base fee:
Using the LN channel provided by an operator or other users to transfer coins car-
ries an associated LN fee. Opening a channel has also maintenance costs (fee setup,
market and nodes monitoring, connections) and costs related to locking Bitcoins
and providing liquidity in the channel.
• φ, main blockchain rate fee:
We assume that a fraction φ of the value transferred in each transaction needs to
be paid by the sender to have it included in blocks and validated by miners.
The probability of opening a new LN channel between two nodes pLNij can be
modeled as a function of (i) the costs associated with opening the LN channel (if the
costs are significantly smaller than using the Bitcoin blockchain, there is an incentive
for the users towards opening the channel), (ii) users’ affinity (the more likely are users
to transact over a period of time τ , the higher the benefits of opening a channel), (iii)
the wealth of the nodes (nodes wishing to open a LN channel have to lock a minimal
amount of Bitcoins on the main blockchain as collateral).
The growth of the Lightning Network can be modeled as a bond percolation
process on a set of N nodes representing Bitcoin users. The edges then represent new
Lightning channels being opened. In particular, we construct the bond percolation
model considering fitness-dependent networks [45–48]. In fitness models, the network
topology is determined by (i) an attachment kernel f(x, y), describing the probability
that a node with fitness x will connect to a node with fitness y, and (ii) the distribution
of fitness ρ(x) across nodes.
The network we consider has a fixed number of nodes N – corresponding to all
Bitcoin users that may decide to switch to the LN – and is sparse, i.e. the number M
of edges is M  N2. If we consider node i and j having fitness xi and xj respectively,
a LN channel, i.e. an edge between them, is added with probability
pLNij = f(xi, xj) ∼ O(1/N) . (1)
The resulting network is undirected if f(x, y) = f(y, x), which is a sensible requirement:
indeed, opening a LN channel between two nodes will require a “symmetric" commitment
from both nodes to lock Bitcoins on the main blockchain. In our model, we will consider
bond percolation only: number and “state" of the nodes (e.g. occupied/unoccupied or
infected/susceptible) will not change.
In the context of the LN network, we define the fitness xi of node i as the simplest
8increasing function of both capacity and volume of transactions, i.e.
xi = wi(`i + 1) , (2)
where wi represents the wealth of the node, and `i + 1 ≥ 1 its “activity" in terms of
number of transactions expected to be sent through the channel∗. As in [46], we consider
the fitness to be defined in the interval [0,∞].
Given this definition of the node fitness, the fitness distribution can be calculated
from the wealth and activity distributions, Π(w) and Πˆ(`) respectively, as
ρ(x) =
∑
`≥0
Πˆ(`)
∫ ∞
0
dw Π(w)δ (x− w(`+ 1)) . (3)
If we imagine links are added one at a time at a given rate, from the kernel f(x, y) we
can derive the probability that a node with fitness x increases its degree by one as [45]
λ(x,N) =
1
N
∫∞
0
dyf(x, y)ρ(y)
κ
, (4)
where Nκ ∼ O(1) is the average degree of the network with N nodes, with
κ =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
dxdy ρ(x)ρ(y)f(x, y) . (5)
We also define λ(x) = Nλ(x,N) and rewrite it as
λ(x) =
1
κ
∫ ∞
0
dy f(x, y)ρ(y) . (6)
Note that λ(x) clearly satisfies the following normalization condition∫ ∞
0
λ(x)ρ(x)dx = 1 . (7)
The degree distribution P (k) for large N is given by
P (k) =
∫ ∞
0
dx ρ(x)
e−Nκλ(x)[Nκλ(x)]k
k!
, (8)
whose average degree is 〈k〉 = Nκ, as shown in detail in Appendix A.
In the following, we will assume that the activity distribution is Poisson with
average n¯, Πˆ(`) = exp(−n¯)n¯`/`!, and that the connectivity kernel models the effects
of blockchain and LN fees as follows
f(x, y) =
µ
N
Θ(xφ− c)Θ(yφ− c) , (9)
where Θ(z) is the Heaviside step function†. The interpretation of this kernel is as
follows: agent i expects to interact with µ other agents, which we assume for simplicity
are chosen randomly.
∗We assume that all nodes are potentially active, xi > 0 for all i.
†We have checked that smoothing f(x, y), e.g. by multiplying the thetas by xy/(1 + xy) or
1− exp(−(x+ y)), has a minimal impact on the results.
9Figure 2. Schematic representation of the emergence of the connected component
among fit nodes, below (left) and above (right) the percolation threshold. Light blue
triangles represent nodes whose fitness is smaller than c/φ, while dark blue circles
represent “high-fitness" nodes with x > c/φ. N is the total number of Bitcoin users,
N+ is the fraction of “high-fitness nodes" (see Eq. (10)) and NC is the fraction of
high-fitness nodes belonging to the giant connected component.
The probability of interacting with a given agent j is equal to µ/N for all j. Agent
i wishes to transfer an amount wi(`i+1) (corresponding to `i+1 transactions of size wi)
to each of them, and is willing to open a Lightning channel if the cost of maintaining it
(c) is lower than the cost of transferring the money through the blockchain (wi(`i+1)φ).
The same considerations apply to its counterpart j.
We define
N+ =
N∑
i=1
Θ(xiφ− c) (10)
the number of nodes with “high" fitness, for whom it is economically viable to engage
in a LN. Note that N+ is a random variable, which depends on the realization of the
fitnesses. We define the average fraction f+ = 〈N+〉/N .
The network constructed via the sequential deposition of links (as described above)
may undergo a percolation transition [44, 45, 49, 50] as a function of f+, such that –
beyond a critical value of f+ – a giant connected component of NC nodes emerges,
whose fractional average size S = 〈NC〉/N remains finite as N → ∞. We stress that
in any fixed instance NC ≤ N+, since some high-fitness nodes may still not engage in
LN (see Fig. 2). In our language, this connected component represents the set of nodes
that not only do exploit Lightning channels to exchange wealth off-chain between nearest
neighbors, but may also transfer wealth to any “distant node", routing the transaction
via connected paths. It is therefore of paramount importance to understand under which
conditions on the average wealth, average volume of transactions, and routing fees, this
transition may happen, and what finite fraction of nodes will it involve.
With the choice of the kernel in (9), the topology of the resulting Lightning Network
of N+ nodes is that of an Erdős-Rényi (E-R) graph with average degree equal to
µf+ ∼ O(1). At odds with the standard model of E-R graphs, in our case the size
10
of the graph N+ is itself a random variable, which depends on the parameters of the
model. In fact, once f+ has been obtained, the model can be mapped onto a site
percolation problem on random networks, where each node is occupied with probability
f+, and the emergence of a viable Lightning Network corresponds to the emergence of
a giant component of occupied nodes [51].
The relevant percolation theory is summarized in Appendix B to make the paper
self-contained.
3.1. Uniform wealth distribution
We now take Π(w) – the pdf of wealth across nodes – as uniform in the interval [0, w0].
Hence, we have
ρ(u)(x) =
∑
`≥0
e−n¯n¯`
`!
∫ w0
0
dw
w0
δ (x− w(`+ 1)) , (11)
where the superscript (u) refers to uniform wealth distribution. Simplifying we obtain
ρ(u)(x) =
1
w0
∑
`≥d x
w0
−1e
e−n¯n¯`
`!(`+ 1)
=
1
w0n¯
1− Γ
(
d x
w0
e, n¯
)
Γ
(
d x
w0
e
)
 , (12)
where Γ(a, x) =
∫∞
x
ta−1e−tdt, and dze denotes the smallest integer larger than z. In
this case, it follows from (6) and (9) that
λ(u)(x) =
1
f
(u)
+
Θ(xφ− c) , (13)
where f (u)+ is the average fraction of high-fitness nodes and is given by
f
(u)
+ =
∫ ∞
c/φ
dx ρ(u)(x) =
1
w0
∑
`≥0
e−n¯n¯`
`!
∫ w0
0
dw Θ(w(`+ 1)− c/φ) , (14)
which requires w > c/[(`+ 1)φ], in turn constraining c/[(`+ 1)φ] ≤ w0 → ` ≥ d cw0φ − 1e
(which may also be negative). Therefore
f
(u)
+ =
1
w0
∑
`=max
(
0,d c
w0φ
−1e
)
e−n¯n¯`
`!
∫ w0
c
(`+1)φ
dw = Ψ(0)− c
φw0
Ψ(−1) , (15)
where
Ψ(t) =
∑
`=max
(
0,d c
w0φ
−1e
)
e−n¯n¯`
`!
(`+ 1)t . (16)
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The evaluation of P (u)(k) from (8) requires some care, as λ(u)(x) is zero if x < c/φ.
Splitting the integration region, we get
P (u)(k) = δk,0
∫ c/φ
0
dx ρ(u)(x) +
e−µf
(u)
+ (µf
(u)
+ )
k
k!
∫ ∞
c/φ
dx ρ(u)(x)
=
(
1− f (u)+
)
δk,0 + f
(u)
+
e−µf
(u)
+ (µf
(u)
+ )
k
k!
. (17)
The interpretation of (17) is quite neat: on average, the network contains a fraction
1− f+ of isolated (low-fitness) nodes, and a fraction f+ of high-fitness nodes that may
(or may not) partake in the LN, establishing sparse random connections with an average
of µf+ other high-fitness nodes. Computing now the generating function (B.1)
G
(u)
0 (s) = 1− f (u)+ + f (u)+ exp
(
µf
(u)
+ (s− 1)
)
, (18)
it follows from Eq. (B.2) that
G
(u)
1 (s) =
G
(u)′
0 (s)
G
(u)′
0 (1)
= exp
(
µf
(u)
+ (s− 1)
)
. (19)
The general theory (see Appendix B, in particular Eq. (B.20)) then implies that the
equation determining 0 < ξ? ≤ 1 is
ξ? = exp
[
µf
(u)
+ (ξ
? − 1)
]
. (20)
The average size of the giant component thus reads from Eq. (B.19)
S(u) = (1− ξ?)f (u)+ , (21)
and the condition in Eq. (B.17) for the giant component to appear is
µf
(u)
+ > 1 . (22)
The interpretation of this condition is fairly obvious: the giant connected component
can only arise if “fit" nodes open on average more than one channel with other fit nodes.
3.2. Exponential wealth distribution
We now take Π(w) to be the exponential pdf with mean w0. The fitness distribution
now becomes
ρ(e)(x) =
∑
`≥0
e−n¯n¯`
`!
∫ ∞
0
dw
w0
e
− w
w0 δ (x− w(`+ 1)) = 1
w0
∑
`≥0
e−n¯n¯`
`!(`+ 1)
e
− x
w0(`+1) .
As in the uniform wealth case
λ(e)(x) =
1
f
(e)
+
Θ(xφ− c) , (23)
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Figure 3. Size of the giant component as a function of n¯ for different combinations
of the parameters φ, c, w0, µ. Simulations with kernel f(x, y) in Eq. (9) and uniform
wealth distribution in the interval [0, w0]. Numerical results have been obtained for
a network of N = 5 · 104 nodes averaging over 5 independent instances. Fixing a
certain fraction S of nodes – connected via LN – and increasing the ratio c/φ between
the Lightning Network and main blockchain fees, we observe that a larger average
volume of LN transactions is required to make the system financially sustainable. The
transition between S = 0 and S > 0 happens at a value of n¯ that we denote n¯?.
Figure 4. Size of the giant component as a function of f (u)+ (the fraction of high-
fitness nodes) varying µ = 2, 4, 6 and fixing w0 = 1, φ = 0.5, c = 6. Simulations
with kernel f(x, y) in Eq. (9) and uniform wealth distribution with parameter w0.
Numerical results have been obtained for a network of N = 5 · 104 nodes averaging
over 5 independent instances. The transition between S = 0 and S > 0 happens at
1/µ as correctly predicted by the condition in Eq. (22).
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where this time f (e)+ reads
f
(e)
+ =
∫ ∞
c/φ
dx ρ(e)(x) =
1
w0
∑
`≥0
e−n¯n¯`
`!
∫ ∞
0
dw e−w/w0Θ(w(`+ 1)− c/φ) , (24)
which requires ` ≥ d c
φw
− 1e. Therefore,
f
(e)
+ = 1−
1
w0
∫ ∞
0
dw e−w/w0
Γ
(
b c
φw
c, n¯
)
Γ
(
b c
φw
c
) , (25)
where dze denotes the largest integer smaller than z. As in the uniform-wealth case
P (e)(k) =
(
1− f (e)+
)
δk,0 + f
(e)
+
e−µf
(e)
+ (µf
(e)
+ )
k
k!
. (26)
Now, consider the solution 0 < η? ≤ 1 of
η? = exp
[
µf
(e)
+ (η
? − 1)
]
. (27)
Then, the average size of the giant component reads
S(e) = (1− η?)f (e)+ , (28)
and the condition for the giant component to appear reads µf (e)+ > 1 (see Fig. 5).
4. Numerical Simulations and Results
We present numerical simulations on networks of N = 5 · 104 nodes, generated by
sequential deposition of links with probability as in Eq. (1), using the kernel in Eq.
(9). In Fig. 4, where we use a uniform distribution of wealth with average w0 = 1, we
plot the average size S(u) of the connected component as a function of n¯, the average
volume of transactions to be deployed on the LN, for varying values of the fees ratio
c/φ. Fixing a certain average fraction S(u) of nodes – which can reach each other via a
connected LN path – and increasing the ratio c/φ between the LN and main-blockchain
fees, we observe that a larger average volume of LN transactions is required to make
the off-chain network financially sustainable. Increasing the average wealth w0 would
push the curves upwards: as more liquidity becomes available across nodes, more and
more players may get involved in the LN for the same level of routing fees. In Fig. 5,
we observe qualitatively the same phenomenon, this time for exponential distribution
of wealth.
To find the size of the largest connected component, we use a breadth-first search
algorithm [52]: starting from a source node s, we label it as belonging to cluster #1. We
then explore its neighborhood and assign all nodes reachable from s to cluster #1 as well.
The algorithm proceeds recursively until either the whole network has been labelled, or
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Figure 5. Size of the giant component as a function of n¯ for different combinations
of the parameters w0, φ, c. Simulations with kernel f(x, y) in Eq. (9) and exponential
wealth distribution with average w0. Numerical results have been obtained for a
network of N = 5 · 104 nodes averaging over 5 independent instances. Increasing w0
for similar values of the ratio c/φ makes the nodes wealthier on average, and therefore
more likely to engage in a LN: as a consequence, the average size of the LN-connected
component increases for a given value of average volume of transactions. The transition
between S = 0 and S > 0 happens at a value of n¯ that we denote n¯?.
no unlabelled nodes can be further reached. In the latter case, we select another random
source among the unlabelled nodes, assign it the label #2, and restart the procedure to
find another cluster. At the end, all disjoint clusters have been identified, and their size
recorded. In our plots, we monitor the size of the largest cluster.
In Fig. 6, we plot the phase diagram in the (φ, c) plane for the uniform
wealth distribution model (very similar results are obtained for the exponential wealth
distribution, not shown). The colors from blue to yellow represent (from low to high)
the values of n¯?, the minimal average volume of transactions that need to be deployed
to make a LN financially viable for a given value of LN and main-blockchain fees, c
and φ, respectively. We observe a transition between two regimes: one (region 1) where
the LN fees are sufficiently low (compared to main-blockchain fees) that any volume of
transactions (however low, n¯? = 0) can be transferred off-chain and still be financially
viable, the other (region 2) where the LN fees are sufficiently high that agents may be
discouraged from opening channels and transferring wealth off-chain unless there is a
minimal volume of transactions to be deployed (n¯? > 0). The higher the ratio c/φ, the
less convenient it is to open LN channels for a fixed value of transactional activity.
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Figure 6. Phase diagram in the (φ, c) plane for uniform wealth distribution in the
interval [0, w0 = 1], µ = 20 and kernel f(x, y) (Eq. (9)). The colors from blue to yellow
represent (from low to high) the values of the minimal average volume of transactions
n¯? that need to be deployed to make a LN financially viable. In region (1) (low
ratio between LN and main-blockchain fees), n¯? = 0, i.e. for any average volume of
transactions, a LN connected component is sustainable. In region (2) (larger ratio
between Lightning and main blockchain fees), n¯? > 0, implying that a LN is not
financially viable unless the volume of transactions is sufficiently high.
5. Conclusions
In summary, we have presented a simple fitness-based network model for the emergence
of a connected set of nodes exchanging wealth off-chain, whose average fractional size
S remains finite as N → ∞. The percolation transition resulting from sequential
deployment of edges is studied numerically and analytically, as a function of a limited
set of parameters that we predict will be in principle possible to infer from empirical or
synthetic [13] data: w0 (related to the average wealth jointly owned by the agents), n¯ (the
average volume of transactions that can be handled off-chain), c, φ (the fees associated
with off-chain and on-chain transactions) and µ (the average number of channel per
node). As a matter of fact, different platforms are currently being offered – but only at
a test stage – where users can experience the Lighting Network services in a simulated
environment. Already at this early stage in the development of a fully operational
payment system, some useful data can be gathered: for instance, the platform ’1ML’∗
currently aggregates information about ∼ 10000 nodes sharing ∼ 30000 channels, with
∗https://1ml.com/statistics
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an average capacity per node of ∼ 1000 USD, and a base fee per transaction of around
0.000072 USD. Similarly, for the Bitcoin blockchain we can gather an estimate of ∼ 0.52
USD as base fee per transaction, as well as more accurate figures about number of
transaction per day and average transaction values ∗.
The function f(x, y) in Eq. (9) has been selected as the simplest but nontrivial
attachment kernel that favors a link (i.e. the opening of a Lightning channel) whenever
the fitness of both concurring nodes (in terms of exchangeable wealth and volume
of predicted activity) exceeds a financially viable threshold. We have checked that
“smoothing" the 0/1- kernel in Eq. (9) has negligible effects on the results, while making
the analytical treatment unnecessarily more complicated. Similarly, the model is fairly
insensitive to the details of the full probability distribution of wealth that is used, while
being flexible enough to generate a desired degree distribution P (k) via a different choice
of the attachment kernel f(x, y) [53]. A percolation transition separates a phase where
no sustainable LN can be formed, from a phase where the fees being charged, the total
available wealth and the average activity conspire to make off-chain payments a viable
option for a finite fraction of the network in the limit N → ∞. The transition is
elucidated analytically and numerically, with excellent agreement.
In the future, this investigation can be extended in the following ways:
• Amechanism for dynamical update of wealth as more channels are opened and funds
are locked may be introduced, to investigate the liquidity constraints of the network
in more detail. Dynamically generated wealth inequalities and concentration may
be detected by means of centrality measures.
• The resilience of the network can be studied under different types of attacks and
compared with available empirical results [7, 11].
• Different choices of the kernel f(x, y) (e.g. non-factorized) may be also explored.
This could lead to networks with heterogeneous (heavy-tailed) degree distribution,
which seems to be in line with recent empirical studies [7].
Once the development of the Lighting Network technology and implementation will have
reached maturity, it will be possible to gather data to calibrate our model, which can
serve as a driver for policy changes and as guidance for incentive mechanisms design.
Appendix A. Degree distribution P (k)
Following [45], the probability pM,N(k|x) that a node in a large undirected graph with
N nodes andM  N2 edges has degree k given that its fitness is x follows the recursion
pM+1,N(k + 1|x) = pM,N(k + 1|x)[1− 2λ(x,N)] + 2pM,N(k|x)λ(x,N) . (A.1)
The interpretation is easy: the probability of having a node with degree k + 1 after an
edge addition (M +1) is equal to the probability that the node already had degree k+1
∗Data available at https://www.blockchain.com/en/charts.
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times the probability that the new edge does not have any of its two terminal points
attached to it ([1 − 2λ(x,N)]), plus the probability that the node had degree k times
the probability that the new edge has one of its two terminal points connected to it
(2λ(x,N)).
Multiplying both sides of Eq. (A.1) by sk and summing over k ≥ 0, we obtain the
following equation for FM,N(s|x) =
∑
k≥0 s
kpM,N(k|x)
FM+1,N(s|x)− FM,N(s|x) = 2FM,N(s|x)(s− 1)λ(x,N) + FM+1,N(0|x)
− FM,N(0|x)(1− 2λ(x,N)) . (A.2)
For large M , Eq. (A.2) can be rewritten as an ordinary differential equation of the form
∂F
∂M
= 2(s− 1)λ(x,N)F + ( ∂F
∂M
+ 2λ(x,N)F )|s=0, with solution
FM,N(s|x) = e 2MN λ(x)(s−1) , (A.3)
where we recall that we defined Nλ(x) = λ(x,N) and we used the initial condition
F0,N(s|x) = 1 that follows from the fact that in a network with zero edges, p0,N(k|x) =
δk,0.
Taylor-expanding around s = 0 and noting that 2M/N = Nκ, we obtain the degree
distribution conditional on the fitness of the node x
pM,N(k|x) = e
−Nκλ(x) (Nκλ(x))k
k!
. (A.4)
Marginalizing with respect to x, we eventually obtain the probability that a node
as degree k (irrespective of its fitness) as
P (k) =
∫ ∞
0
dx pM,N(k|x)ρ(x) =
∫ ∞
0
dx
e−Nκλ(x) (Nκλ(x))k
k!
ρ(x) , (A.5)
which correctly implies
〈k〉 =
∑
k≥0
kP (k) = Nκ , (A.6)
using (7).
Appendix B. Giant component
The generating function of the probability that a node has degree k is denoted by
G0(s) =
∑
k≥0
P (k)sk . (B.1)
We introduce the generating function G1(s) of the (normalized) probability that by
following a randomly chosen edge we reach a node with degree k
G1(s) =
∑
k≥1 kP (k)s
k−1∑
k≥0 kP (k)
=
G′0(s)
G′0(1)
=
G′0(s)
Nκ
. (B.2)
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This is because the node we reach by following a randomly chosen edge has degree
distribution kP (k)/Nκ rather than just P (k) – since a randomly chosen edge is more
likely to lead to a node of higher degree.
We also define the generating function of the number of nodes that can be reached
following a randomly chosen edge and that belong to a connected component of size t
with size distribution∗ ψ(t)
H1(x) =
∑
t≥1
ψ(t)xt . (B.4)
Moreover, we indicate with H0(x) the generating function of the probability that a
randomly chosen node belongs to a connected component of size t
H0(x) =
∑
t≥1
pi(t)xt . (B.5)
Assuming that the typical component sizes are finite and that the chances of a
component containing a closed loop of edges are negligible for sufficiently large N , the
distribution of components generated by H1(x) can be obtained as follows [45, 49, 50].
Let us denote by ζ(t|k) the probability that a node with degree k belongs to a component
of size t
ζ(t|k) =
∑
t1≥1
· · ·
∑
tk≥1
δ
(
t− 1,
k∑
m=1
tm
)
k∏
m=1
ψ(tm) , (B.6)
where δ(a, b) is the Kronecker delta. Indeed, the sum of the sizes of the components
that can be reached by following the k edges departing from the node must be equal to
t− 1, and each of these sizes is drawn from the distribution ψ(t).
Marginalizing over the degree distribution, we obtain the probability pi(t) that a
randomly chosen node belongs to a component of size t as
pi(t) =
∑
k≥0
P (k)ζ(t|k) . (B.7)
Computing H0(x) from (B.5)
H0(x) =
∑
t≥1
pi(t)xt =
∑
t≥1
xt
∑
k≥0
P (k)ζ(t|k)
=
∑
k≥0
P (k)
∑
t≥1
xt
∑
t1≥1
· · ·
∑
tk≥1
δ
(
t− 1,
k∑
m=1
tm
)
k∏
m=1
ψ(tm)
= x
∑
k≥0
P (k)
∑
t1≥1
· · ·
∑
tk≥1
x
∑
m tm
k∏
m=1
ψ(tm) = x
∑
k≥0
P (k)
[∑
t≥1
ψ(t)xt
]k
= xG0(H1(x)) ,
(B.8)
∗More precisely,
H1(x) = lim
N→∞
N∑
t=1
ψ(t,N)xt , (B.3)
where ψ(t,N) is the probability that – in a network with N nodes – by following a randomly chosen
link, we reach a component of size t ≤ N , and similarly for H0(x) in (B.5).
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where we have used (B.1) and (B.4). The calculation for H1(x) is analogous, with the
replacement P (k) → kP (k)∑
k′ k′P (k′)
. Summarizing, the two equations to be solved together
are
H0(x) = xG0(H1(x)) , (B.9)
H1(x) = xG1(H1(x)) . (B.10)
The average size 〈t〉 of the connected components is given from (B.5) as
〈t〉 =
∑
t≥1
tpi(t) = H ′0(1) . (B.11)
H ′0(1) can be obtained from (B.9) as
H ′0(1) = G0(H1(1)) +G
′
0(H1(1))H
′
1(1) . (B.12)
Note that from (B.4) it follows that H1(1) = 1 (by normalization of Ψ(t)). Similarly,
from (B.1), we have that G0(1) = 1 (by normalization of P (k)). Eq. (B.12) can be
therefore simplified as follows
H ′0(1) = 1 +G
′
0(1)H
′
1(1) . (B.13)
We can then compute H ′1(1) using (B.10)
H ′1(1) = G1(H1(1)) +G
′
1(H1(1))H
′
1(1) . (B.14)
As before, we can simplify it using the fact that H1(1) = 1 and that G1(1) =∑
k kP (k)s
k−1∑
k kP (k)
∣∣∣∣
s=1
= 1 (see(B.2)), obtaining:
H ′1(1) = 1 +G
′
1(1)H
′
1(1)⇒ H ′1(1) =
1
1−G′1(1)
. (B.15)
Substituting (B.15) in (B.13) yields
〈t〉 = H ′0(1) = 1 +
G′0(1)
1−G′1(1)
, (B.16)
which diverges when
1−G′1(1) = 0 (B.17)
or equivalently (using (B.2)) when G′′0(1) = Nκ, signalling the emergence of the giant
component.
When the giant component has formed, H0(x) and H1(x) (see Eq. (B.3), (B.4),
(B.5)) become the sum of two contributions: one where the sum is restricted to
components of size t ∼ o(N), and the other restricted to (giant) components of size
t ∼ O(N). Assuming that there is only one such giant component, Eq. (B.5) for x = 1
can then be written as
1 = H
(f)
0 (1) + S , (B.18)
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where H(f)0 (1) (and similarly H
(f)
1 (1)) satisfy the equations (B.9) and (B.10), as they
include ∼ o(N) contributions for N →∞ coming from components other than the giant
one, whereas S = NC/N is the fraction of nodes that belong to the giant component.
Therefore (from (B.9) and (B.10))
S = 1−G0(ξ?) , (B.19)
where ξ? satisfies
ξ? = G1(ξ
?) . (B.20)
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